SITREP 8/8/24: Day Three of Kursk Attack, Major Updates – Simplicius
Fri 8:05 am +01:00, 9 Aug 2024 Let’s get right into the Kursk offensive, which has heated up and remains tense. There’s a lot of information to cover so I’ll eschew any flowery extravagances and contextualizations, getting right down to details instead. Firstly, what’s been made clear is this is a serious offensive, rather than “TikTok border raid” like the ones of May and June last year, in Belgorod region. Not only are Ukrainian units utilizing fairly strict Opsec protocols, but it’s clear an entire preformed multi-brigade operational taskforce has been assembled, consisting of several elite units, some of which took part in the 2023 Zaporozhye offensive. Some have posted this list, though take it with a grain of salt because there is virtually no proof at all of most of these brigades’ involvement just yet:
The 22nd was blooded in the Bakhmut battle, while the 82nd is a famous elite brigade that was given the German Marders, American Strykers, and British Challengers for the Zaporozhye offensive. And we have now seen many Strykers and some Marders in Kursk—which, by the way, has garnered controversy given that German “tanks” are now officially back on old Russian territory—and Kursk of all places!—for the first time since WWII:
Here they are being hit when Russian Lancets decimated Ukrainian columns in the Kursk region yesterday: Getting back: The earlier listed brigades are not, as of this time, fully staffed but rather a mishmash of various battalions, detachments, elements, etc., of these brigades. Thus, there’s not actually tens of thousands of troops, as that would suggest, but perhaps 2000 at most for now, according to Russian MOD. The two most important questions then are: how did Ukraine get so many fresh men, and how did they breach the border so badly? Let’s examine: Firstly, Russia has apparently been planning its own Sumy incursion for a long time. As such, it’s said that they were in the process of having cleared most of the mines in the region, in order to facilitate their own future advances. This is the first big difference with the Zaporozhye offensive of 2023, which was stopped in large part, as you may recall, by Russia’s vast mine system. The Ukrainian penetration in Kharkov had no minefields to go through, although later on Russian correspondents noted the presence of the ISDM Zemledeliye “Agriculture” remote-mining system, which scatters mines to Ukraine’s rear by firing them MLRS-style. Russia reportedly has large reserves in the area, but they were no where near the border so as not to have their concentrations targeted by potential long-range strikes like HIMARS/ATACMS, etc. Thus, the initial Ukrainian penetration was apparently met only with border guards, some combination of Rosgvardia, FSB guards, and potentially conscripts. This was how Ukraine initially made a large capture of dozens of hapless border guards directly at the first border checkpoint, which has been geolocated to here: Watch below—the tactic described by AFU sources was that they initially bombarded the border checkpoint with FPV drones, which can be seen in the video, causing the trapped guards to surrender en masse: Second: This offensive has by all accounts been extremely well-planned and coordinated, with “sources” claiming involvement of British MI6, which is only to be expected. There are many write-ups of the precise tactics utilized by the advancing AFU forces, of which I’ll post a couple: First, why Kursk itself, and not an offensive in another region? This is a sensible conclusion I can’t disagree with:
In general, the advance was described as very well coordinated, where Ukrainian drone teams lead the way with FPV barrages, which took out Russia’s “eyes and ears” in the sky, by targeting not only fortifications but Russian surveillance drones. This was all covered by an effective EW net that was said to have caused many problems for Russian communications in the region, which happened to be timed with a massive DDOS attack taking out the region’s internet:
Since many Russian groups use various WhatsApp/Discord/etc. type of apps to coordinate, this likely affected communications along with the EW jamming. As reported last time, all this was also timed with a mass psyop campaign, like the deep fakes of the Kursk region governor I posted last time, meant to sow confusion at a critical moment. In short: it’s a text book assault, with nothing bad that can be said about it. Ukraine chose a region that was a soft underbelly and accumulated a force disparity against a bunch of nearly defenseless Russian border guards and conscripts. However, as soon as Ukrainian forces began incurring, they were hit mercilessly from Russia’s fire-strike-complex. What’s remarkable is that besides the first border checkpoint capture of Russian troops, Ukrainian units have posted nearly no other Russian losses whatsoever. Russians on the other hand have now posted a verifiable dozens of destroyed armored vehicles of all types. Yesterday, Russian MOD claimed over 600 manpower losses for the AFU already. Even if we assume this number is exaggerated, the MOD’s vehicular losses was something in the 60-80 region, which is mostly in line with verified losses. So, if they didn’t lie about the vehicle hits, why would they lie about the manpower number? Entire columns of Ukrainian vehicles have been hit, but that doesn’t mean they were all destroyed: images appeared of engineering vehicles attempting to salvage some of the damaged vehicles, so a percentage has likely been saved. I posted a video earlier of Marders being hit, but there are many others of various tanks and IFVs, IMVs, APCs, ICVs, etc. For instance: Here’s another destroyed mini column: Iskander or Tornado-S cluster attack on column: There are at least 4-6 other videos showing destructions of vehicles, as well as a dozen or more showing drone drops on infantry, including this one with evacuated wounded: Combined with yesterday’s video of mass Iskander cluster hits on columns, with some counting ~20 or more vehicles hit, we can get to at least 40-60 counted hits so far. The problem is, Ukraine is using a lot of light expendable vehicles, particularly the types it has virtually no shortage of, which are the IMV (Infantry Mobility Vehicles), which includes things like MRAPS, Humvees, and Novator armored cars. Now we see frantic calls for blood donations in Sumy hospitals, which usually signals heavy casualties: Ukraine also utilized very good tactics in sending DRG—sabotage and recon groups—far in advance to create chaos in the “rear” of Russian units, intercept rushing reinforcements on roads, all while avoiding large groupings of Russian troops, and essentially bypassing settlements rather than fully “capturing” them. There’s even one report of the DRGs dressing up as Russian troops to take over checkpoints, which they’ve used many times before.
Two more enlightening posts of AFU’s tactics: However, now that heavy Russian reinforcements are beginning to arrive in the region, things have slowed down and stabilized for now. But before we get to where things are heading next, let’s answer the second question from earlier: Where Did Ukraine Get All That Manpower?I had begun mentioning it last time, but there is now increasing evidence that Zelensky deliberately starved frontline brigades of reinforcements and replenishment in order to build these rear combat brigades for the Kursk offensive. We now have a shocking new Economist article, which states outright that entire battalions on the Pokrovsk front are manned by a mere 20 people—keep in mind a battalion is supposed to have at least 800: A couple other highlights: Now there are reports from several sources claiming that wily Zelensky in fact utilized all those new 8-14 brigades he recently claimed he had been saving up, but which weren’t sufficiently armed yet, according to him:
You’ll recall last time I posted one opinion that his “not sufficiently armed” statement was a bluff—deliberate misdirection. If this is really the case, then that means this may be Ukraine’s final big hurrah offensive, the one they had been saving up for a long time as their last needle-moving attempt to affect “coming negotiations”. If these brigades are recklessly thrown away in the same way that the 10th and 11th Corps were done during the Zaporozhye ‘23 offensive, then the fat lady may sing for the AFU as a whole, as there will be no reserves left, particularly to contain Russia’s coming breakthroughs in the Donbass direction. And we have several new indications that improving the negotiations position is in fact the operative goal here. First, from presidential advisor Mikhail Podolyak: You’ll note above he reaches the conclusion at the end of the video, that the current operation is all about influencing Russia to lower its demands in the negotiation process. Rob Lee seems to agree: Of course, the danger is that Ukraine can strengthen its position in a far more dangerous way than merely taking some uninhabited rural zone. It’s becoming increasingly likely that Ukraine’s real target is the Kursk nuclear power plant, as AFU forces have veered sharply in that direction earlier today, before being stopped dangerously far at around Kromskie Byki, according to Ukrainian maps: We don’t quite know yet if it’s a larger force or just smaller DRG attacks, but if Ukraine has managed to get the cavalry up there, that puts them a mere 25km from the nuclear power plant. And as referenced last time, that would just about already put the plant within artillery range, give or take. The Greater DangerBy far the greatest danger lies in the very high possibility that Ukraine may yet cunningly introduce additional brigades in a secondary or even tertiary direction. There are some rumors and indications of this, including troop build up sightings, etc. The likely vector would be further west around Glukhov (Hlukhiv on map), in order to cut across to Rylsk, where they would meet the initial force coming in from Sudzha, to entirely cut off that “shelf”, which would give them total control of a good portion of Russian territory from which they could subsequently stage brigade level advances toward the Kursk plant: There are now strong whispers from several sources that AFU has also built up another grouping of brigades in the Belgorod direction which is getting ready to open up a new direction—but it’s not specified precisely where in Belgorod. I’d guess in the old Grayvoron area from 2023 to try to frazzle the Russian Volchansk grouping. As of now, it’s claimed Ukrainian forces were stopped at Korenevo after Russian reinforcements arrived: But there’s no definitive indication yet whether the Russian forces there can hold out or not, and how far away heavier reinforcements are. Both sides are surprisingly sticking to greater than normal Opsec.
Others have gotten the same idea, as I saw this map posted elsewhere, which even references the rumors of buildups on the Glukhov side: There is potential for other possible directions, but this one would make the most strategic sense to insert the other brigades. No one knows for certain how many units are already in use, though some have speculated only 3-5 of the brigades—or rather elements of them—have been used in the Sudzha direction.
Thus, if it’s true that Zelensky has gone all-in hail mary style with the remaining reserves, then there could be half a dozen more brigades left to be utilized, though they’re likely not fully manned, and can only contribute a good battalion or two each.
So: the conclusion is that, depending on how prepared the Russian side is, how good its intelligence is, how many forces in reserve they can bring, and how quickly they can position them, will determine whether this offensive is halted and contained roughly where it’s at now, or whether new break-outs can occur which spiral out of control like the infamous Balakleya-Izyum-Kharkov debacle of September 2022. There are all sorts of stories of various elite Russian units streaming into the region now, from the elite 45th Spetsnaz of the Airborne Forces, to Aida special forces of the Akhmat unit, to allegedly Wagner, and the experienced Pyatnashka brigade.
And:
There is potential for this operation to turn into a war-ending disaster for Ukraine. Recall that since last year to early this year, many prominent figures on both sides—which include Budanov on the Ukrainian side, Russian commander of the Center Group General Mordvichev—stated that “the decisive battles of the war will be fought in summer 2024” and that the war will effectively be settled at this time. They seemed to all know something we didn’t at the time. Maybe these predictions are finally coming home to roost, and perhaps Ukraine is throwing everything into the fire for one last desperate attempt to unman Russia in some decisive way. If that’s the case, it’s certainly a valiant effort, and makes more sense than simply throwing waves of meat at highly reinforced Donbass fortresses. I’ve been saying for a long time now, that the only trump cards Ukraine has left, are some small, relatively easy to attain objectives which can make huge symbolic or PR splashes; i.e. Zaporozhye plant, Kerch Bridge, Crimea, etc. All these things are easier than defeating the entire Russian Army in detail. But it seems Ukraine may have found one other alternative we hadn’t considered in the Kursk plant, whose unexpected trajectory was lightly defended. However, make no mistake, there is also a major danger here for Russia. As I said, it all depends how adequately and competently Russian General Staff can assess the true strategic thought behind the operation. If they can correctly predict the new secondary vectors, and adequately prepare forces to respond to them, grabbing the initiative to stymy the AFU’s plans, then it may turn to naught for Ukraine. But if they continue getting caught with their pants down, and functioning only passively or reactively, letting Ukraine maintain combat initiative, then Ukraine may keep two steps ahead, and snow-ball the assault into another Kharkov-style collapse which would turn into a huge headache for Russia. Such a headache would be reputationally very costly, given that it would degrade Russian citizens’ trust in their government, Putin’s leadership, etc. This is particularly the case since many have already complained that Russia’s handling of the ongoing events has been lackluster, with little warning given to civilians to evacuate, causing many to now be injured, and a growing number killed. A video reportedly of Sudzha residents making an appeal to Putin has already appeared: Lastly, this thought: for now, there are a lot of doomers wailing about a mass Russian disaster of unprecedented scale. We know so little of the ongoing details that for now, I can’t in good faith objectively judge the operation before a little more time has passed. That’s because the much smaller Belgorod incursion in 2023 took two full weeks to suppress, and weeks further after that to fully clear Russian territory of Ukrainian DRGs. Now, we don’t even remember that raid anymore—a mere blip in history that left nothing more than scattered AFU corpses in its wake. Thus, we have to wait and see how quickly and competently Russian forces can respond to the current incursion. If they manage to preempt the potentially cunning second phase waiting in the chamber, and boot the AFU out in a matter of weeks, then it would be difficult to call it a ‘disaster’ of any kind in retrospect. This is particularly the case because so far Ukraine has objectively been suffering vastly more losses, barring the initial POW captures, and so thus far, the offensive is much costlier for Ukraine. But that can always change, so as I said, it all depends on how Russian command navigates this situation. Even the worst case scenario for Russia won’t end the war, but merely create a big headache. But the worst case scenario for Ukraine, could potentially be a war-ending blunder of over-extension, given that Ukraine stands to waste its last reserves, which could lead to a chain of collapses in Donbass from which Ukraine would never recover. And speaking of those, while the Kursk breakout has been ongoing, Russia has continued capturing several new zones in Donbass, with the Pokrovsk direction particularly feeling the pressure. One of the most striking were reports that Russians have begun storming Hrodivka, which you can see below is already getting pretty close to Pokrovsk, and is actually inside ‘Pokrovsk urban agglomeration’: In the above photo, Serhivka and Zhelanne are also in the process of being captured, or have already been so, according to some as-yet unverified reports. Closeup on Zhelanne from yesterday: Ukrainian officer Tatarigami has written an entire article that—despite the “successes” in Kursk—continues to show skepticism toward the operation, given how badly the Donbass front is collapsing for the AFU: He specifically cites the lack of manpower and reserves in the Pokrovsk and Toretsk directions, as highlighted by the earlier Economist article. He writes:
So while we can’t be absolutely certain just yet, there is a high chance that the Kursk breakout is a fatal gambit by Zelensky, a last throw of the dice, to try to keep the Donbass front from collapsing by causing some dilemma in Russia’s rear.
— A couple other ‘strange’ or interesting things to point out. Firstly, there could be something brewing in the AFU’s high ranks given that Sarah Ashton-Cirillo recently dropped those “serious charges” against Syrsky, with claims of proof that he’s a Russian plant. Now today, there were stories that Defense Minister Umerov survived an assassination attempt as his car reportedly exploded, though it seems he was unharmed. That story remains unverified, but if there’s truth to it, the timing of these two stories appears to coincide quite interestingly with the launch of the offensive. Not sure what to quite make of it yet, but it’s something to watch. Secondly, there’s another odd story to watch concerning the sudden flare-up of operations in Syria. There were reports local tribes began attacking the Kurds in the Deir-Ezzor region, with claims that they captured some of the first oil fields from American forces. The Americans there were hit with strikes days ago which reportedly left half a dozen of them injured. Now suddenly, we get this uncorroborated report:
The reason all this dovetails in intriguing fashion is that Putin may have finally chosen to ‘escalate’ asymmetrically against the U.S. in light of the attacks on Kursk. Recall his words: Amid other ongoing reports that Russia is supplying a large amount of air defense equipment to Iran, there could be potential for a Russian-driven escalation in this region as ‘payback’ for the crossing of a red line in the Kursk attack. On the topic of that ‘red line’: not only is Western equipment being used in Russia proper, but there are now reports that the invading force is overflowing with Western mercenaries—with Polish and French languages being heard on radio comms, as well as Georgian mercenary sightings:
From Kursk: Sundry items: The claim that F-16s were spotted over Kakhovka, unverified for now:
— Apti Alaudinov explains how the AFU was able to bypass the border so quickly: He mentions resources: there were some heavy rumors and claims that, just like infamous Ukrainian border embezzlement, the Russian border defense fortification construction was riddled with massive graft, and was never properly finished. There are many other rumors, which include outright treason on behalf of some Russian artillery commander who “let the enemy through” then disappeared: No proof of that, but anything’s possible. — Russian airforce and long range missile strikes have been hammering the AFU Kursk grouping’s rear, with unverified reports of various commanders having been taken out already: Lastly, notorious Azov acting commander Bogdan Krotevych calls for Russia’s enemies to take advantage of the Kursk gambit and regain their territories: Meanwhile, formern Ukrainian Minister of Infrastructure Omelyan says if they just had a few more volunteers, they would have taken Moscow by now: Your support is invaluable. If you enjoyed the read, I would greatly appreciate if you subscribed to a monthly/yearly pledge to support my work, so that I may continue providing you with detailed, incisive reports like this one. Alternatively, you can t |