Does Turkiye need NATO ?
Tue 2:11 pm +00:00, 7 Jul 2026Türkiye’s Security Map Has Changed
For more than seven decades, NATO has shaped not only Türkiye’s defense policies but also its security institutions, strategic culture, and geopolitical orientation. Yet the strategic environment that justified Türkiye’s accession in 1952 no longer exists. Today, Türkiye’s security priorities increasingly diverge from those of NATO. While the alliance remains primarily focused on containing Russia, Türkiye’s most immediate challenges lie to its south and in the Eastern Mediterranean. The contest over the Blue Homeland and the TRNC, the militarization of the Aegean, terrorist organizations operating from northern Syria and Iraq, the continuing U.S. military presence in the region, and the expanding Israel-centered geopolitical order constitute Ankara’s principal security concerns.
The Cold War security map has been replaced by a far more complex multipolar landscape. Unlike the Türkiye of 1952, today’s Türkiye possesses a mature defense industry, indigenous missile technology, advanced UAV and UCAV capabilities, a powerful navy, and a coherent maritime strategy embodied in the Blue Homeland doctrine. It also occupies a unique position linking the Black Sea, the Caucasus, the Balkans, the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Turkic world, Africa, and the Red Sea. In this new geopolitical reality, Türkiye is no longer merely NATO’s southeastern flank but an independent regional power with its own strategic priorities.
Although Türkiye competes with both Russia and Iran in certain theaters, these countries remain permanent neighbors. Ankara’s long-term interest is to manage competition, preserve regional stability, and avoid becoming a party to unnecessary great-power conflicts. NATO’s current strategic direction, however, increasingly risks drawing Türkiye into confrontations that do not directly serve its national interests.
The fundamental question, therefore, is not whether NATO has changed. Its strategic logic has remained remarkably consistent since its founding. What has changed is Türkiye itself—its geopolitical position, its national capabilities, and its security requirements. For that reason, Türkiye’s security strategy should no longer be defined primarily by NATO’s threat assessments, but by a national security map derived from its own geography, interests, and strategic priorities.
The Anti-Türkiye Policies of NATO Members
The credibility of any alliance is ultimately measured by the solidarity it demonstrates when one of its members faces security threats. By that standard, NATO’s record toward Türkiye over the past four decades raises serious questions. On issues central to Turkish national security—including PKK terrorism, the war in Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Blue Homeland doctrine—many NATO members have adopted policies that directly contradict Ankara’s interests. While the PKK has been allowed political and legal space in several allied countries, the United States has armed and trained the YPG/PYD in Syria despite Türkiye’s repeated objections. Following the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016, the continued presence of FETÖ members in NATO countries and the refusal to extradite leading figures of the organization further deepened Ankara’s distrust toward its allies.
The same pattern is evident in defense and regional security. Türkiye was subjected to CAATSA sanctions over its purchase of the S-400 air defense system and expelled from the F-35 program, while Greece has rapidly expanded its military capabilities with strong American support. The transformation of Alexandroupoli into a major U.S. logistics hub, the lifting of the arms embargo on the Greek Cypriot Administration, and continued support for the U.S.–Israel–Greece–Greek Cypriot alignment in the Eastern Mediterranean demonstrate that key NATO members increasingly disregard Türkiye’s security concerns. Taken together, these developments suggest the emergence of a geopolitical framework that seeks not merely to contain Russia but also to constrain Türkiye’s strategic freedom of action from the Aegean to the Eastern Mediterranean and northern Syria.
This trend has become increasingly explicit. Only days before the NATO Summit in Ankara, 0n 2nd of July 2026 a hearing at the U.S. House of Representatives’ Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission described Türkiye as an “occupier” and an “expansionist” power, directly challenged the legitimacy of the TRNC and the Blue Homeland doctrine, and called for additional measures against Ankara.
Similar arguments are increasingly found in American and Israeli strategic circles, where Türkiye’s pursuit of strategic autonomy, its engagement with a multipolar world, and its Blue Homeland doctrine are frequently portrayed as challenges to Western interests. At the same time, Greece has effectively used its position within NATO to advance its own national agenda while seeking to restrict Türkiye’s strategic room for maneuver.
Taken together, these developments inevitably raise a fundamental question: how credible is an alliance that fails to support Türkiye against the PKK and YPG, offers no meaningful solidarity regarding FETÖ, opposes Ankara’s interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, and increasingly portrays Türkiye’s maritime strategy as a threat, while at the same time expecting Türkiye to assume the risks of collective defense? Every NATO member ultimately prioritizes its own national interests. Türkiye can no longer afford to do otherwise.
Article 5: Security Guarantee or Strategic Trap?
Article 5, NATO’s collective defense clause, is widely regarded as the alliance’s ultimate security guarantee. Yet in international politics, no guarantee is absolute. In asymmetric alliances, the strategic priorities of the dominant power do not always coincide with the national interests of the other members. Throughout history, alliances have carried two fundamental risks: abandonment in times of crisis and entrapment in wars that do not serve national interests. For Türkiye today, the greater danger is no longer abandonment but entrapment.
A military confrontation in the Baltic, the Black Sea, the Eastern Mediterranean, Syria, or during a future crisis involving Iran could rapidly escalate through miscalculation, provocation, or even a false-flag incident. Under such circumstances, Türkiye could find itself drawn into a major-power conflict that bears little relation to its own national security priorities. As NATO’s southeastern member, Türkiye risks becoming a frontline state in a war that it neither initiated nor sought.
Recent developments illustrate that NATO increasingly operates according to calculations of power, burden-sharing, and national interests rather than shared strategic priorities. Disputes over European security during the Trump administration, growing pressure on allies to increase defense spending, and differing positions among NATO members during the Iran-Israel crisis all demonstrate that alliance solidarity has become increasingly conditional.
For Türkiye, therefore, the central strategic question is no longer whether NATO would come to its defense if attacked. The more pressing question is whether NATO could instead become the mechanism through which Türkiye is drawn into a conflict that does not serve its own national interests. In the second century of the Republic, this is one of the most critical issues that deserves open and serious national debate.
Türkiye’s Soft Underbelly: Economic Fragility
Today, Türkiye’s greatest strategic vulnerability is not military weakness but economic fragility. An economic model dependent on external financing, short-term capital inflows, and foreign investment inevitably constrains decision-making in foreign and security policy. As economic sovereignty declines, so does strategic autonomy. A state that depends on external financial confidence inevitably faces limits on its geopolitical freedom of action.
This is why the debate over NATO in Türkiye is ultimately shaped as much by economics as by security. Successive governments have sought to preserve financial stability by maintaining the confidence of international markets, while opposition parties have generally pursued the same objective through different political means. Consequently, neither side has been willing to openly confront the broader strategic implications of Türkiye’s long-term dependence on the Atlantic system.
Türkiye therefore faces a historic strategic choice. One path is to preserve close alignment with the Atlantic system in exchange for short-term economic stability and continued access to international capital. This may reduce immediate economic risks, but it also constrains strategic autonomy and increases the likelihood of Türkiye becoming involved in geopolitical crises that do not directly serve its national interests.
The alternative is to strengthen economic sovereignty through a production-based national development strategy that reduces dependence on external financing. Such a transition would almost certainly involve short-term economic costs and political challenges. Yet it would also expand Türkiye’s freedom of strategic decision-making and reinforce its geopolitical independence.
In the Republic’s second century, the central question is not simply how to achieve economic growth, but how to reconcile economic resilience with strategic sovereignty. The price of greater economic independence may be painful. The price of geopolitical dependence, however, is often paid with national sovereignty—and, ultimately, with the lives of a nation’s sons and daughters.
Türkiye’s Security Requires a New Strategic Framework
During the Cold War, Türkiye was NATO’s southeastern flank, positioned to contain the Soviet Union. Today, its strategic environment has fundamentally changed. Türkiye faces growing security challenges in the Eastern Mediterranean and along its southern borders, while being expected to align with NATO’s confrontational posture toward Russia and Iran. In such circumstances, remaining fully integrated into NATO’s military command structure increasingly risks creating strategic dependence rather than enhancing national security. In the Republic’s second century, Türkiye’s objective should not be to serve as another power’s frontline state, but to become the central power of its own geopolitical space.
The real debate, therefore, is not simply NATO membership itself but whether continued participation in NATO’s integrated military command best serves Türkiye’s national interests. In 1966, under the leadership of General Charles de Gaulle, France withdrew from NATO’s integrated military command while remaining a member of the alliance, thereby restoring full national control over its armed forces. Türkiye should seriously examine whether a similar model would better protect its strategic autonomy. Beyond operational issues, NATO’s command, control, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C2ISR) architecture also raises legitimate concerns regarding access to sensitive national military information. The experience of the Ergenekon and Sledgehammer trials, during which FETÖ infiltrated and obtained highly classified military documents, followed by the continued protection of many FETÖ fugitives in NATO countries after the failed coup attempt, has further deepened these concerns.
At the same time, American tactical nuclear weapons stationed in Türkiye and the Kürecik X-Band Radar increase the risk that the country could become a priority target during a future confrontation involving major powers, regardless of its own national interests. Türkiye should therefore restore full sovereign control over all military facilities on its territory, ensure that every military activity involving the Turkish Armed Forces is conducted exclusively under national authority, and retain the unrestricted right to decide questions of war and peace according solely to its own national interests.
In this respect, the 2026 NATO Summit in Ankara represents more than another alliance meeting. It marks a strategic crossroads for Türkiye itself. The choice before the Republic in its second century is whether to remain an indispensable but increasingly exposed outpost of the Atlantic security system, or to recover the strategic autonomy envisioned by Atatürk and build a national security architecture based on Türkiye’s own geopolitical realities and national interests. The sovereign authority to decide on war and peace must belong exclusively to the Turkish state. Economic costs can be managed and overcome. The loss of geopolitical independence is far more difficult to recover.
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This article was originally published on Mavi Vatan.
Ret Admiral Cem Gürdeniz, Writer, Geopolitical Expert, Theorist and creator of the Turkish Bluehomeland (Mavi Vatan) doctrine. He served as the Chief of Strategy Department and then the head of Plans and Policy Division in Turkish Naval Forces Headquarters. As his combat duties, he has served as the commander of Amphibious Ships Group and Mine Fleet between 2007 and 2009. He retired in 2012. He established Hamit Naci Blue Homeland Foundation in 2021. He has published numerous books on geopolitics, maritime strategy, maritime history and maritime culture. He is also a honorary member of ATASAM.
He is a Research Associate of the Centre for Research on Globalization (CRG).
https://www.globalresearch.ca/nato-creates-risks-not-security-turkiye
