New Ukrainian counter offensive expected soon – Strelkov
Thu 10:46 am +00:00, 2 Jul 2026
Source: https://slavlandchronicles.substack.com/p/strelkov-status-update-a-new-uaf
To the newbies, Strelkov is the man who started the Donbass rebellion and who was arrested for criticizing the Kremlin, calling them foreign agents, essentially.
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First up, more suicidal tactics, frontal assaults on fortified positions in Donbass.
Here:
In principle, the situation is STILL developing STRICTLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE ENEMY’S STRATEGIC PLAN: our troops continue to “exhaust themselves” with any attacks in secondary (for the enemy) directions (especially since the “Donetsk fortified region” – or rather, the “network of fortified regions” – was originally intended for this kind of “strategic defense” – it “has MANY TIMES EXCEEDED” the tasks assigned to it by the enemy and is STILL FULFILLING THEM!). At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces have begun implementing long-prepared and, thanks to the launch of mass production, finally implementing plans to gain air superiority and inflict damage on strategic targets deep in Russia.
UAF and NATO on fuel refineries are part of a long term strategy to strangle Russia, not the fevered death throes of a cornered global empire that knows the game is up.
At this point, the enemy has succeeded in achieving both the first (including isolating our southern flank from normal supplies for both troops and the population) and the second: THE ENEMY HAS ALREADY INCREASED SEVERE, TARGETED DAMAGE TO OUR FUEL PRODUCTION AND IS WORKING TO FINISH OFF EVERYTHING IT CAN REACH. Now (with the strike on Voronezh and Dubna, among others), the enemy has begun the “methodical” destruction of our most important military industrial facilities, communications, and so on. Moreover, their “pancakes” have, unfortunately, “not gone awry” at all… Now (right now), the enemy has an opportunity they have never seen before in the war: to attempt a major offensive operation with, if not complete, then partial air superiority.
That would be something, to see the UAF use their new donated NATO jets to fly sorties over Russia.
Naturally, this superiority is not “everywhere,” but the enemy has achieved it precisely in the strategically crucial “Dnieper-Crimean” direction. Our air defense and air defense assets in Crimea are, by all appearances, “battered”; much of this theater of operations is under the “umbrella” of medium-range UAVs, which (due to their numbers and skilled use) allow for “cutting off the front from the rear,” while the rear itself is “fragmented” in such a way that rapid maneuvering of reserves/forces/assets is greatly hampered (and in some places, downright impossible, given the “knocked out” bridges and ferries). This situation, of course, “will not last forever”—our command (I mean the Aerospace Forces and Air Defense) will, of course, find an “antidote” to mitigate the damage from enemy influence.
A prediction of an active offensive from the UAF to commence within a month, perhaps! In the soft south, the so-called land bridge territories that connect to Crimea.
Therefore, the conclusion is: the enemy (likely) has several weeks to conduct its own active offensive (including amphibious) operations. Provided, of course, he has the forces and resources to do so (I personally assume he has both, but I can’t be certain they have enough for a “guaranteed” success, or even close to it). In any case, the threat to our left flank is very great. And no further “head-on” attacks in the Donetsk, Kharkov, and Sumy directions will prevent the enemy from actively operating in the south, if he is able or willing to do so.
Belarus’ role is an enigma for the foreseeable future.
A “separate issue” in the overall strategic situation is the emerging “1st Belorussian Front,” the threat of which is currently being actively discussed. Moreover, it must be said that for both Russia and the so-called “Ukraine,” its emergence has very serious advantages and disadvantages. Right now, I must admit, for me the situation is not just “not entirely clear,” but “completely unclear.” “The fog of war” in my current situation is “almost impenetrable.” But! “There are reference points.” In fact, there aren’t many:
1) Zelenskyy’s statements about a “threat from the north” and the declared “defensive measures” (which are quite logical, however, not only for the purposes of a hypothetical “defense against invasion,” but also for preparing for/camouflaging upcoming active operations). Frankly, I can neither believe nor verify the possibility of a current concentration of forces by our Armed Forces/the Armed Forces of the Republic of Belarus. But I also have no grounds to dismiss such a possibility out of hand due to the lack of any “classified” data. Theoretically, anything is possible.
2) Zelenskyy-Lukashenko’s “ultimatum” would seem to indicate the exact opposite: that the “initiative” in a possible escalation will/could belong to Kyiv. – This is also evidenced by the very cautious response of the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Belarus, who directly stated that it is “unprofitable/undesirable for the Republic of Belarus to enter the war” (June 22).
3) In a possible escalation, whoever holds the initiative (i.e. “moderates” the conflict) will inevitably try (and probably be able) to “increase the advantages” and “maximum reduce the disadvantages” for themselves. And, accordingly, the situation will be exactly the opposite for those WHO ARE ATTACKED.
4) For the Russian Federation, Belarus is a SORT OF “economic and trade outlet” + “production base, “guaranteed” from enemy strikes/attacks (for now). – In such a situation, for Moscow, in fact, ANY involvement of Minsk in the war is EXTREMELY NOT BENEFICIAL: we most likely do not have enough forces for a “quick success” from the territory of the Republic of Belarus, and the “disadvantages” (in such a situation, immediately
The Mozyr Oil Refinery, in particular, which has now increased gasoline supplies to Russia by 13 times (according to open sources) is “going away.” And it’s not alone. The risks are too significant.
Actually, Peskov came out the other day and announced that Russia was looking to buy gasoline and other refined petroleum products from abroad because of their inability to refine it at home anymore.
Incroyable.
Hence the conclusion: Kyiv (which possesses relatively large reserves of “manpower”—simply because it is, on the whole, still able to maintain the “mandatory two-month rotation” of units on the front lines) clearly benefits more from “opening a second front” than Moscow, which will have to seek reserves to “bolster” the underpowered Belarusian army and “tighten its belt” after supplies from Belarus are cut off due to the inevitable and effective enemy strikes.
At the same time, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (its command) may well “escalate” the situation on the northern borders of “Ukraine” solely to “mask” its offensive intentions in the southern/Crimean direction. After all, IF a “northern front” actually emerges, it will drain the energy of not only the RF/Russia Armed Forces, but also the Ukrainian/Ukrainian Armed Forces. And (no matter what they say in Kyiv), the so-called “Ukraine” is also severely exhausted in its fifth year of war, and “two fronts” won’t last long.
Naturally, this (very primitive and approximate) analysis doesn’t take into account many possible (but unknown to me) factors: the likelihood of “intervention by the ‘Coalition of the Willing,’” for example… under the pretext of “aggression by Belarus and the Russian Federation against ‘Ukraine’” (after all, if the Ukrainian Armed Forces do attack, they will certainly announce “to the whole world” the “aggression of Moscow and Minsk,” and “the whole world” (EU/NATO) will “instantly and completely believe them.”
Conclusion: I (in my opinion) assess the likelihood of an attack by the Russian Federation from the territory of the Republic of Belarus as “nearly negligible” (although I cannot “dismiss” it due to the repeatedly demonstrated CRETINISM of our military-political leadership). I rate the likelihood of an “unrestricted attack” by the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the Republic of Belarus as “low.” However, a “limited attack” (a strike on targets of interest to Kyiv—linked to Russia) is, I believe, very likely.
with respect and gratitude,
Igor Girkin
To the newbies, Strelkov is the man who started the Donbass rebellion and who was arrested for criticizing the Kremlin, calling them foreign agents, essentially.
