SITREP 12/21/24: Things Heat Up in Kherson, Ukraine Losses Update, and More
Sun 6:55 am +00:00, 22 Dec 2024
After a period of strange rumors that Russian forces may attempt to storm the Dnieper, last night Russian forces began a massive artillery and MLRS bombardment of the Kherson region with claimed attempts of isolated groups to cross to the other side. Details are scarce, and no one quite yet knows if this is all a part of some psyop campaign to throw the AFU off, or a real concerted beginning toward a major operation. Here’s what some of the reports are saying:
From RVVoenkor: They report Russian forces stormed the Antonovsky Bridge area and captured or consolidated the dachas around it:
Nikolayev governor Kim confirmed some of the information in a video, though he remained confident, claiming Ukrainian forces on that side are ready for everything and that populations can be evacuated if necessary. The interesting wrinkle was a new satellite map revealed that Ukraine had recently constructed a line of fortifications just in front of the area where Russia seemed to aim their assault, as if they had premonition of it: A wider view for context so you can see where the fortifications are in reference to the Antonovsky assault—Vysoke seen above is circled below, with the yellow line indicating the rough placement of fortifications: The situation is confused because the AFU itself continues attempts to storm the river, with both small DRGs which are quickly eliminated, as well as larger forces. This video from last week gave the first recent glimpse of what the riverbed in that area may look like: A final report claimed some Russian sabotage groups even made it to the other side, but at this stage it’s impossible to verify it as yet:
— Elsewhere, Russian forces have finally captured virtually all of the residential parts of Kurakhove, with only the industrial western area with the thermal power plant remaining: They’ve also captured the entirety of Novy Komar north of Velyka Novosilka: As well as expanding their hold in the southwest pincer and making their way into the town proper in the southeast, slowly bringing the stronghold into encirclement. In the last report I covered how General Syrsky inadvertantly exposed the West’s narrative of high Russian losses with his bombshell that Russia actually gained 100k troops just in 2024 alone. Now we have something complementary to further reinforce and supplement this determination. Yesterday another ‘exchange of bodies’ was announced, which was so lopsided in Russia’s favor that even I was at first instinctually skeptical. For the past two exchanges, the numbers were extremely lopsided, nor any ‘source’ given so I retained a healthy sense of skepticism, refusing to post about it until I can uncover more validating info for myself. Previously, the exchanges I had reported on went as follows:
Since then, there have been three new claimed exchanges as follows: November 8 another claimed exchange occurred as follows: November 8 exchange: 37 Russian bodies vs. 563 Ukrainian bodies. As you can see, the last few have gotten so lopsided it began to raise questions. I looked into the sources and was shocked to find they were pretty much verified by Ukraine’s side, with a small caveat. Taking just yesterday’s as an example, it was reported directly by Russian Duma deputy Shamsail Saraliev, which was subsequently reposted by all the top Russian news outlets like Lenta, Tass, RBC, etc.
It was further independently corroborated by frontline reporter Alexander Kots who gained further information from his own sources, including the precise checkpoint where the exchange occurred, which was Gomel, Belarus region: But this is still just ‘hearsay’ from the Russian side. So now we turn to what Ukrainian officials reported. The official Telegram channel for the ‘Ukrainian Coordination Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War’ reported on the exchange of bodies. This organization is part of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine and appears to be headed by Budanov himself since 2022. Their official website is here, which also reported on the exchange, even listing precisely where all 503 Ukrainian bodies were from: Now here’s the catch: None of the Ukrainian sources list the Russian bodies returned to Russia—only Russia itself lists this. So, we do have confirmation from bothsides of the Ukrainian body count, but only confirmation from the Russian side for the Russian bodycount. This means technically Russia could be making up a lower figure—to play devil’s advocate—but it is unlikely. Why? Because if Russia’s bodycount was high, Ukraine would readily have reported it. For instance, if the exchange was around ~500 to ~500, then you would think logically the Ukrainian sources would have noted the Russian losses. But because the Russian losses appear so comparatively low, the Ukrainian reports simply omit them, only listing their own repatriated bodies in order to maintain narrative. Thus, we can say with fairly high confidence that the exchanges are probably accurate, and this points to horrific loss ratios for Ukraine. Let’s tally them all up:
Russian losses: 331 Now, the next natural objection is always: “Ukraine is retreating, so Russia gets to pick up more of the bodies, while Ukraine leaves its dead behind.” Yes, and the reason Ukraine is retreating is because they’re taking heavier losses and losing in general. If they weren’t taking the losses, they wouldn’t be retreating—it would be Russia retreating. But, wait: “That’s not right. Ukraine isn’t necessarily retreating because they’re taking heavier losses, it’s because Russia has MORE men! Ukraine is so outnumbered, they can dole out more casualties onto Russia while still being forced to retreat due to being outnumbered!” Yes, unfortunately Ukraine started off the war vastly outnumbering Russia with a claimed 1 million troops to Russia’s 250,000. How is it that Russia is now outnumbering Ukraine by such a high count? There’s only one answer, and you know what it is. Of course, it is true Russia is likely picking up more dead and thus the 8:1 ratio is probably skewed somewhat in accordance to this; I’m simply arguing that the ‘retreating’ myth is not entirely responsible for it. Maybe instead of 8:1 the real ratio is 5:1 or whatever it may be, but we have every indication it’s still greatly in Russia’s favor—this is just the latest in a long line of evidence which includes Syrsky’s stunning admission of 100k net Russian gain for 2024 while Ukrainian officials simultaneously revealed Ukraine now suffers a net monthly loss of troops. Also, one of the reports stated the following:
— Which segues us:
The article goes on to write that Ukraine is sending air defense soldiers as infantry:
Of course, this was countered by certain Russian analysts noting that recently Russia even sent Strategic Missile Force troops as assault infantry as well. And I mentioned previously Russia was reportedly making assault squads out of airfield technicians, pilots, et cetera. However, upon digging I did learn these were not actively needed personnel, and were usually people who were deemed reserves or redundant in their positions. Either way, the contradiction can easily be explained by the classic 3:1 ratio needed for successful assaults. If Russian troops hypothetically outnumber Ukraine on a given front by a large amount, they could still technically be considered “short on troops” because you need a much larger force disparity to successfully assault without huge losses. Simply assaulting head-on at 1:1 could succeed but with high losses, so it’s best to concentrate as high disparities as possible, for which Russia presumably seeks to generate additional forces wherever possible in order to effect this. There are also the previous tooth-to-tail arguments, given that Ukraine can afford to field more frontline units out of its “total” active force since NATO fills in as Ukraine’s ‘rear’ noncombat contingent. Meanwhile, Russia can have far more ‘active’ units, but is required to utilize more of them in noncombat logistics roles, thus needing to generate more active combat ones. Ukrainian journalist Vladimir Boyko said that he foresees by spring of 2025, the AFU will simply begin to scatter and run away on every front: We may be entering a stage of heightened Ukrainian provocation attempts in lead up to Trump’s inauguration. There has been a rash of SBU-orchestrated arson attacks throughout Russia, assassinations—like that of General Kirillov—followed by various new ATACMS, HIMARS, and drone strikes, particularly yesterday’s brazen one on various residential buildings in Kazan. I agree with the following analysis, which is very much to the point:
This comes just as CIA chief Burns visited Kiev for the last time, likely to give Zelensky his final instructions: The objective is to create a swell of negative perception around Russia’s war efforts in order to keep Ukraine in the game when the expected “negotiations” season starts upon Trump’s arrival. The problem is, recent signals indicate Trump may infact be regressing into the same old warhawk model as reports came today that Trump intends to continue arming Ukraine come late January: This could be more preemptive sabotage by the MSM, but Trump has not yet denied it, as he so often vociferously does when some ‘fake news’ about him is spread. As such, we cannot help but make the following projection for one possible outcome: When Trump takes office and ceasefire overtures to Russia are rejected, Trump may revert to more war as suggested above. In this case, we now know from other recent sources that Zelensky has internally agreed to drop the mobilization age if more weapons are promised. As such, if Trump allows the war hawks to totally puppeteer him again, we can foresee an outcome where Ukraine lowers mobilization and the war continues on in the current grinding fashion. After all, a Ukrainian advisor to the Committee on Economic Development stated on video that the age will definitely be lowered to 18-20 by February 2025.
We can see that, as is always the case, Trump appears to be backsliding on all campaign promises. Early reports claimed he was exploring options to support Israel striking Iran, and now the new reports about continuing military aid to Ukraine. It seems increasingly likely the swamp will slowly assimilate Trump’s second term leading ultimately to little difference in foreign policy from the Biden administration. Lastly, as of this writing it’s being reported a US Navy F/A-18 Super Hornet has been shot down by its own Ticonderoga class warship while conducting illegal terror strikes against Yemen: Recall the talks of Russia’s “IFF failures” and ‘unprofessionalism’ when Russia suffered friendly fire incidents. Except Russia is in a near-peer conflict, while the US IFF doesn’t even function in a low contested environment. The US couldn’t even shoot down a Chinese balloon without major failures. The US would rue the day it ever got into a near-peer scenario, as such incidents would be near daily occurrences in today’s highly degraded and deteriorated US armed forces. Your support is invaluable. If you enjoyed the read, I would greatly appreciate if you subscribed to a monthly/yearly pledge to support my work, so that I may continue providing you with detailed, incisive reports like this one. Alternatively, you can tip here: buymeacoffee.com/Simplicius |




























