SITREP 11/2/24: Another Big Tone Change as West Now Fears Ukraine’s Doom – Simplicius
Sun 10:57 am +00:00, 3 Nov 2024 Russian forces continue advancing along the southeastern front as Western headlines descend into ever-more-hopeless pleas. Moon of Alabama covered this angle well today, showcasing the NY Times’ gradual descent in pessimism in particular. The epitomizing article that’s been making the rounds happens to be this one, and it provides many revealing new details: First of all, recall last time I had mentioned how the Western press is finally beginning to call a spade by its name; they’ve been loosening restrictions on previous propaganda diktats from above, such has the situation deteriorated. So this NYT article opens with the following shocker:
For months they tried desperately to sell the situation as a “stalemate” despite all obvious signs being that Russia was gaining strength while Kiev was merely conjuring the appearance of empty action by launching futile, showy assaults in places like Khrnki or Kursk. Now the reality has finally hit home and hard—for the first time officials are uttering the truth as it is. Of course, they still end up uttering the ridiculous lie that Ukraine has now lost “only” 57,000 troops while Russia’s losses “double that.” Another major admission which demonstrates the quality of US official statements and assessments:
The most ironic part of that is in the adjacent paragraph they again state that Russian forces could be depleted by summer 2025, at which point Kiev could ‘capitalize’ on that. Who are they kidding? They just admitted their assessments are useless. That’s not to mention that just a few paragraphs later they contradict themselves with this viral bombshell: You should know the standard formula by now: season in a few lies to soften the blow, then unleash the difficult to swallow truth in the following paragraphs. It is interesting though, isn’t it, how everyone continues to predict the war’s end by spring-summer of 2025, and here the Pentagon admits that Ukraine may run out of troops precisely by that time, which would initiate what we can only assume is a complete collapse. At the same time they admit that despite claims of high losses, Russia continues to recruit adequate numbers:
“Hero of Ukraine” Major General Marchenko confirms most of the above in two new videos where he says there are shortages of everything, from troops to ammunition, and that brigades are extremely exhausted: The Economist joins in the newly unrestrained reporting tenor, wherein free admission is now given that Ukraine is not fighting to “win” any imaginary victories anymore, but at this point, for sheer survival: Their opening paragraph stencils over NYT’s exact earlier sentiment:
The article claims Russia too has problems and if a large breakthrough was created soon, they would not be able to ‘exploit it’:
Note the qualifier “short-term”—so they admit that on a slightly longer time-scale, Odessa is already in danger? The article’s main thesis echoes what’s now a common refrain all across the pro-Ukrainian landscape:
Ukrainian officer Tatarigami said no less himself just earlier today when he wrote: Some may recall this was my own common calling card since last year. I repeatedly wrote that Russia is suffering huge problems in this war, but they simply pale in comparison to those of Ukraine and the West—and in a race to the bottom, it is Ukraine that will unquestionably win. The Economist article ends with:
As a final major source joining in on this new bent of accepting reality, we have the latest article from Mykola Bielieskov, whom some of you may know as a senior analyst that appears on Phillips O’Brien’s podcast and has worked in a variety of NGOs and think-tanks, including under the Ukrainian President’s Office and RUSI. I’ve listened to the O’Brien podcast just to hear Bielieskov talk because he is exceptionally knowledgeable and adept at analysis, remaining fairly grounded compared to many other more ‘famous’ analysts, while still being compelled to inflate Ukraine’s hopes. However, it seems even he has finally come around: Writing for the Atlantic Council, he underscores the same thesis at discussion here:
The article ends with:
Well, I think that’s pretty self-explanatory. In short, the West’s top analysts now understand the severity of the situation. For a variety of converging reasons, Ukraine seems to have 6-12 months left of fighting at this pace, with this level of “support” from the West. And what may come next could really speed up the downfall, and get those dominoes toppling. For the past few reports I’ve made continued mention about rumors of a large-scale Russian offensive building up on the southern Zaporozhye line. The flow of whispers about this has become so large as to be impossible to ignore at this point. Last time it was Budanov himself who said Russia may gun for Zaporozhye city, now we have an unverified report from ‘German intelligence’:
The thing is, this report is actually corroborated by the sighting of ongoing fortifications being built near Dnipro and Pavlograd:
The above write up misspells a couple places, but this video appears to correct it. The fortifications are being built near “Pischenka” In that particular case, it would seem the fortifications are not to withstand an offensive from the south, but rather one from the east in Pavlograd. And there have been rumors that Russia’s offensive will be multi-pronged with one major fork going toward Pavlograd from the Pokrovsk and Ugledar direction, while perhaps the western-most flank near Energodar will try to advance north to Zaporozhye city. Here’s Rezident UA channel, which, despite many people considering a mostly propaganda channel, has actually been proven accurate more times than not:
If the above is true, here’s how I see it playing out. Firstly, here’s the Pokrovsk front now. I found it humorous that one of the earlier articles said, as if in consolation, that “Russia has not been able to capture Pokrovsk yet. Correction: Russia has not even attemptedto capture Pokrovsk yet, and will likely not do so until they have fully flattened out the front like so: The red arrows represent where the captured areas should come up to before Pokrovsk is slowly enveloped, so that the salient is not too overstretched. For that front to flatten out you will notice that Kurakhove will have to be captured—this is currently in progress as we speak. Russian forces have already begun storming Kurakhove from its eastern suburbs, but the fortress town is a very tricky one as it’s protected by a reservoir on the north side and wide open fields with little cover to the south. However, Russians are advancing quickly from the south. Recall last time they had just begun to capture Yasna Polyana, and as can be seen, are already north of there, and have captured a large portion to its east, including Maskymovka: A pro-UA mapper notes:
Note the road running west of Kurakhove as the final main supply route, which runs through Dachne on the map. If Russians can reach that road, Kurakhove should be effectively blockaded. Then once that entire empty area to the southeast falls, the front should be more or less consolidated and we will be one step closer to the final showdown on Pokrovsk. Here are the main supply routes of the region: The main line runs straight from Pokrovsk to Pavlograd, and Russian forces could attempt to follow that directly, using it as their own backbone. It may seem like a long way to Pavlograd, but Ukrainian figures have repeatedly noted that there are no major fortifications west of Pokrovsk, and that if Russia captures the city, there is a danger for a total collapse of defenses such that Pavlograd can be reached at record speeds. BILD’s Julian Roepcke reinforces these ideas. Listen particularly at around the 2:20 mark. He says what others have been saying: that Pokrovsk is the main logistics terminal of the entire Donbass region, and if it falls, there are nothing left but poor dirt roads to feed the remainder of the AFU contingent; as such he expects Donbass to be entirely lost after Pokrovsk: A very intriguing report which can shed new light on Ukraine’s losses:
This is taken from an official interview with the Aidar commander at Unian. So, the Aidar commander states that they are recruiting and mobilizing “one and a half times less” new men each month than the total sanitary losses for the same period. A couple reports ago I shared the official Ukrainian piece from Hromadske that recruitment is down by 40% and that the monthly number appears to be around 20k: This is corroborated by other previous reports that said after the May mobilization, Ukraine hit a monthly peak of 30-35k but then dropped to less than half of that. So, using all the above figures, if we know that total monthly mobilization is somewhere around 15,000 to 20,000 as per several independent reports. The wording he uses is a little odd: “one and a half times less”. But if we are to assume this is the same as “one and a half times greater” than the mobilization number, then 15k and 20k multiplied by 1.5 gets us between 37.5k and 50k monthly losses. This would be 1,266 to 1,666 losses per day. However, he states specifically these are sanitary losses, which accounts for both types of wounded. We can further break this down with KIA being roughly 1/3 or so, which would make 400-500 KIA, and the rest distributed between light wounded and irrecoverably wounded or maimed. That means about 800 per day would be irrecoverable losses, which is KIA plus heavily wounded only. Interestingly, he specifically states in the interview that these numbers do not even take into account 500s or AWOLs, which is a whole other matter—that is the “SPF” mentioned in the yellow below: Recently, Ukrainian journalists again reported that over 100,000 have already deserted the AFU with the number now 380 desertions per day:
If you add that to the total losses of 1,600 or so, we get almost 2,000 daily losses of all types, 200, 300, and 500. Much of this was also underscored by two new videos: Ukrainian mobilization officer says there are no more volunteers at all who show up to voluntarily enlist, whereas even in 2023 there were still some:
The other is Ukrainian General Krivonos who states that only 10 out of 100 mobilized people even reach the frontline (1:30 of video below):
From one of Ukraine’s top channels—note the audience reaction emojis underneath: In general, it’s hard to imagine the AFU surviving such attrition rates for longer than 6 months. If they are recruiting 20k but losing 50k, that means the entire armed forces is essentially losing a net 30k men per month. In only 6 months that would be 30k x 6 = 180k, which would represent an entire regional front, like for instance the whole Zaporozhye line, or the entire Donetsk quadrant, etc. Perhaps this is why the Pentagon has now said Ukraine only has 6-12 months of troops left? Remember, the same sources say Russia not only breaks even, but is gaining a net positive manpower per month, building new strength and brigades. If there’s any truth to both sides of those numbers, then it would not be physically possible for the AFU to survive past 6 months or so. Recall, all the above numbers and reports I presented on the AFU are from original Ukrainian sources like the Aidar commander—no speculation whatsoever. However, recall that Zelensky still has a final trump card, which is lowering the mobilization age to 18-20. This could immediately buy him more time, but it could also bring some kind of revolt or social uprising in the country. It’s a risky move but it would obviously give Ukraine hundreds of thousands of more men, that could buy another year or so at the most. Some sources state the decision is already mostly made and that Zelensky and his team are just waiting for the US elections to finish up so that the decision to lower mobilization can be blamed on the new US administration “abandoning Ukraine” and forcing it to make such “difficult decisions”. Also, Zelensky will likely want to give the new admin a chance, to see if they can spring some miracle aid rather than leave him to his fate. Rezident channel reports:
And:
Last items: Multiple sources report that Russia and Ukraine are in some sort of ‘secret negotiations’ to limit attacks on each other’s energy grids once again. There is FT: And German Zeit:
All we can say for now is that for the record, Russia has already dismissed this as fake propaganda.
— UN Rep Nebenzya again reiterated that Russia will not compromise in any negotiations, and all previous demands must be fulfilled: demilitarization, deNazification, etc., etc. He also states that with each day that passes, Ukraine will have to give up more territory to Russia in any future negotiations: Lavrov later reiterated the same statement:
— Lavrov also met with the North Korean Foreign Ministry, which had some very encouraging words for the Russian operation:
— On the topic of North Koreans, Biden has now stated that Ukraine will only be given permission to “fire on the North Koreans” if they cross over into Ukraine. Well, obviously—I don’t think they need special permission for that. But the underlying message appears to be that the presence of defensive DPRK troops in Kursk will not cause the US to give Ukraine special permissions to fire into Russia or onto the DPRK troops themselves, which is another in a long line of setbacks for Zelensky: Zelensky also claims that Russia has already officially informed Western states that North Korean troops are there and will take part in combat. That may be the case, but as stated it would likely be defensive only in Kursk as per the strategic mutual defense pact signed between Russia and Korea. For his part Nebenzya says it’s none of anyone’s business what Russia does with North Korean troops. He asks the obvious question: what gives US the right to help Ukraine, but Russia’s allies are not allowed to help Russia?
— A new BBC article makes this hilariously ironic and dilatory admission: — As another example of Ukrainian troop woes, Rada MP Mariana Bezuglaya gives further updates as to how Ukrainian air defenses have been degraded due to Syrsky mobilizing the technicians into frontline combat units: The Russian side has been doing this to airforce crews for some time as well, however, as per FighterBomber. But the difference is, Russia has a lot more “fat” in its Airforce, Navy, etc., which can be trimmed due to those branches’ more limited participation in the war owing to their size. Russian Geran usage update: The alleged high interception rate makes no difference, half the reason Russia even uses these drones is to merely deplete Western AD ammo, which costs far more than the drone itself. Of course, that’s when they can even hit it—footage from Kiev earlier today: — New reports and photos claim Russia has finally been actively building hardened aircraft shelters and well as blast barriers at various airfields around Ukraine: — Several of the articles quoted at the opening of this report have published — Lastly, a Russian commander shows how Selidovo was captured with new movement tactics:
And by the way, when they captured Selidovo, Russian forces of the Samara-based 30th Brigade sent a creative message indicating the future capture of Kiev: A quick message: thank you to everyone who contributed to my little Tip Jar fund from last time. I had stated it had run a bit dry and you all responded with overwhelming support as it immediately shot back up to arbitrarily established monthly goals (basically whatever it was before the dip), which was a pleasant shock. So, a big thanks to you all! Your support is invaluable. If you enjoyed the read, I would greatly appreciate if you subscribed to a monthly/yearly pledge to support my work, so that I may continue providing you with detailed, incisive reports like this one. Alternatively, you can tip here: buymeacoffee.com/Simplicius |