Things continue apace in Ukraine, with Zelensky seemingly losing his nerve about the inability to improve his position in the Kursk region. Thus Ukraine has again flirted with danger by sending an FPV drone to the nearby Kursk nuclear power plant.

More and more the West is drumming up the ‘nuclear threat’, which included a new video reportedly made in the US showing a Russian nuke’s impact on Kiev, all of which continues the timely discussion I began in the paid subscriber piece two days ago.

Now there’s rumor that Putin has decided to punish the wicked responsible for Kursk, and some sort of large scale attack on Kiev government infrastructure is imminent. Several countries issued a security alert

From the official US embassy in Kiev above:

Security Alert: U.S. Embassy Kyiv, Ukraine (August 21, 2024)

Location: Ukraine, all districts

Event: The U.S. Embassy in Kyiv assesses that during the next several days and through the weekend there is an increased risk of both nighttime and daytime Russian drone and missile attacks throughout Ukraine in connection with Ukraine’s Independence Day on August 24.

What gave it some semblance of credibility was Russian ambassador to the US Anatoly Antonov’s statement that Putin has made a “decision” on how to ‘severely punish’ the ones responsible—presumably Ukrainian leadership—for the Kursk invasion:

Commenting on Moscow’s future steps in response to the invasion, the ambassador stated that president Putin has already “made a decision.”He also said that he is “firmly convinced that everyone will be severely punished for what happened in Kursk Region.”

It remains to be seen what kind of punishment we’re talking about. But it’s now expected that Ukraine will occupy Kursk for at least several months, if not half a year or so, with Ukrainian sources claiming the Russian government is massaging the ‘state media’ to introduce this idea as a ‘new normal’.

Ukraine has blown the bridges on the Seym, which means the AFU themselves cannot use them, which implies Ukraine is happy to dig in and occupy the parcel of land they’ve already taken as a thorn in Russia’s side, so that they can continue the information campaign that ‘Ukraine now controls part of Russia, and Putin’s regime is collapsing’ indefinitely. They’ve also begun destroying Russian pontoon attempts, both with FPV and HIMARS:

In fact, several new psyops have been rolled out, including the likely fake announcement that Ukraine intends to hold a referendum on Kursk territory to annex it as a tit-for-tat. Russian forces on the other hand, are digging a large trenchworks outside of the Kursk nuclear power plant:

The reason this is a modest PR victory for Ukraine in the near term future is because not only can they continue claiming they hold Russian territory in an attempt to weaken Putin’s approval, but also continue staging provocations on Russian territory, which include hitting the nuclear plant area with drones, artillery, etc., now that they’re within range of it.

Not to mention it has bolstered morale in the West:

This has had some effect on Russian society, with many media figures now criticizing the government for its soft-handed approach to the war.

Political scientist Professor Evstafyev on Soloviev Live epitomized this with his fiery polemic against Russia’s elites:

This was echoed by Russian military expert Shurygin, who called to finally switch from the SMO format to full-scale war:

“War is war. Either go to war or surrender. The enemy has now been on our territory for 2 weeks.”

State TV: Russian military expert Vladislav Shurygin is pushing for Russia to switch from Special Military Operation to full scale war in light of Ukraine’s recent invasion of the Kursk region.

Some people have begun to view Russia’s elites as being in a state of paralysis when it comes to escalation management. I will admit that I don’t think Putin and his ruling class’s handling particularly of the border regions has been ideal. In a way, it does feel like he tries too hard in keeping society at large sanitized or shielded away from the conflict as it grows on Russia’s own borders. And when he does make statements on the matter, they are usually uninspired and boilerplate, with little demonstrated accountability for anyone involved.

Another way of saying it is that, Russia’s handling of the war comes into its starkest relief during times like this, when Ukraine thrusts the conflict in the face of Russian society, forcing its elites to respond. And the odd nature of Russia’s management of the “SMO” becomes quickly apparent in such cases.

For instance, drones are literally crashing around Russia’s nuclear power plant in Kursk, and yet there are hardly any major statements or actions, just the usual anodyne composure. This is coupled with the striking fact that Russian long range missile attacks on Ukraine have recently been paltry at precisely the time one would think they would be peaking.

However, I do believe there are reasons for most of this. In the case of the missile strikes, Russia likely continues saving up a larger stockpile just in case, given that a potential NATO confrontation edges closer to reality each day.

This is not full-on criticism on my part because I think Russia is still doing what it needs to do in Ukraine at the moment. I simply think that the current highpoint of the conflict’s tension is exposing some of the shakier approaches to the war, but they in no way represent some kind of ‘defeat’ for Russia. It simply exposes some cracks in the foundation—but are those cracks as big as the ones in both Ukraine and the West? No, not even close—which is why context is always important. If you’re stuck in an information bubble watching only Russian doomporn, then you won’t be properly informed.

But what is the real reason for this uptick in tension amidst the Russian commentariat? It isn’t the Kursk incursion itself, particularly given that it’s been stopped for now, with no new Ukrainian gains, and in fact some Russian rollbacks.

No, the other big prompt has been the series of destructive Ukrainian attacks carried out on a wide array of Russian infrastructure. In the past month alone, Ukraine has dealt serious damage to at least three Russian airfields—Lipetsk, Morozovsk, and the Marinovka base in Volgorod just yesterday. Then there have been the new oil terminal hits, with the Rostov one a few days ago being a particularly grievous example. Now they’ve destroyed, what’s being called by some, one of the last functioning oil ferries in Crimea with a hit last night in Kavkaz.

The Rostov oil terminal hit was particularly large:

Though Russia has been adding anti-drone netting, it’s unclear how effective they’ve been thus far:

These combined paint a swelling picture of Russia under fire, such that alarmist titles like the following are given some semblance of notional validation:

And it’s easy to see how some even on the Russian side could begin feeling shaky about Russia’s ongoing war effort, but I have a different take on the ongoing situation. While the latest events have exposed some of the corruptions and shortcomings of the Russian military-state apparatus, at the same time they must be viewed as an accelerated psychological campaign on the part of the West, which is emptying its tank to create a sense of peaking paranoia and a crisis atmosphere for Russia.

Ukraine has for now abandoned its objectives on the ground—in the real war—and has gone all in on the PR element. Granted, we’ve said this many times before, but even in the past Ukraine still balanced the two to a degree: for instance, last year to earlier this year, they still attempted moving forward in areas like Klescheyevka and around Bakhmut, pressing advancements in certain other regions in Zaporozhye. But now, they’ve gone on full retreat, and repurposed the vast majority of their resources to carrying out asymmetric attacks deep inside Russia for the sole purpose of destabilizing Putin’s public concensus.

There is a grave danger in doing this for Ukraine, the consequences of which we’re already beginning to see.

From the Economist article above:

From the author of the article:

The point is that, the collapse around Pokrovsk direction in particular is picking up speed. Yesterday, Ben Hodges downplayed the advances, claiming Russia only gained 50km since the fall of Avdeevka in February of this year. But I examined the timing more closely and found that from February to June, Russia gained about 10km going from around Berdychi, in west Avdeevka area, to somewhere between Sokil and Prohres; so, that’s 10km in 4 months. However, from June to August they’ve now gone 10km+ from there to the current line hear Grodovka, and upwards of 15-20km a bit further south.

That means they are now gaining in 2 months what they previously gained in 4 months. If such an acceleration picks up even more speed, then the collapse could get truly disastrous for Ukraine. At the current pace, Russia would potentially reach Pavlograd by this time next year, itself already not far from Dnipro.

Russians With Attitude had a good breakdown for what the outlook could be after Pokrovsk:

It is the central supply artery for all supply that reaches the Ukrainian forces in the Donbass (there’s still the M03 from Kharkov, but it’s less convenient and has always been secondary, particularly for the southern half of the Donbass).

West of Pokrovsk, there are a hundred kilometers of nothing. Empty steppes until you hit Pavlograd in the northwest, Zaporozhye in the southwest. There are various operations RuAF could employ after capturing Pokrovsk; we will look at them later, when the deed is actually done. But what’s important is that it opens up operational space for the Russian “Center” group and gives them freedom of movement.

Ukrainian Rada MP Bezuglaya actually validated this viewpoint with a long post of her own; read the highlighted portion:

“Our units are being withdrawn from there, leaving entire front lines to their fate, ammunition is not being added, the Russians are passing through empty fortifications. In such circumstances, the occupation of Pokrovsk is a matter of the near future, and Toretsk is living out its last days. It looks as if we are giving up Donetsk Oblast,” she wrote.

“Beyond Pokrovsk is a direct route to Pavlograd, where there are no fortifications at all, then the Dnieper. Beyond Toretsk is the Kramatorsk agglomeration, and then the Kharkiv Oblast… No equipment has been made for the administrative border of Donetsk Oblast,” Bezuglaya added.

According to Bezuglaya, “Syrsky is taking the war to a new level of maneuvers from the times of World War II, where the stakes are on losing or gaining entire regions.”

“But what is the price and what are the prospects? I am sure that he does not have clear answers either. It is a do-or-die game. The surprises are not over. The maneuvers of the Ukrainian Zhukov continue,” the MP said.

And UK’s Sky News says “Russians could take all of Donbass”:

Though it’s collapsing less slowly, the New York – Toretsk front is also undergoing fairly rapid advancement by Russian forces—here’s a map of just the past month:

Toretsk proper has even finally been entered, with Russian forces capturing some preliminary positions inside the city itself:

Ukrainian ‘journalist’ Yuri Butusov exhibited panic:

Ukraine is on the verge of losing Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and the surrounding settlements. This is an important logistical hub for supplying the AFU, and its loss would signify a strategic defeat — Ukrainian propagandist Yuriy Butusov:

“In the past month of fighting, the enemy has completely captured the city of Krasnogorovka, taken control of 80% of the city of New York, entered Toretsk and is engaged in combat there, entered the city of Chasov Yar and is fighting there, and advanced within two kilometers of the dominant slagheap, which controls the approaches to Mirnograd, Pokrovsk, and Selidovo. There is a threat that the enemy may soon advance and engage in battles for these cities.”

“In other words, we are facing the threat of losing a whole series of, or have already lost, or are on the verge of losing, a whole series of important, and as for Pokrovsk, key settlements and cities in the Donbass. Of course, this is a cause for great concern,” Butusov said.

Meanwhile, former Ukrainian presidential advisor Oleg Soskin believes Zelensky’s regime will collapse by October:

Former Kuchma adviser Soskin predicted Zelensky’s imminent collapse “We can say by many indicators – political, economic, financial, military, logistical – that Zelensky’s regime will be completely exhausted by October,” he calculated.

Interestingly, Apti Alaudinov states that not only will Ukraine’s Kursk incursion be over in 2-3 months, but the entire SMO will end at the same time:

In another video he clarified the statement:

In short: he says this year either Ukraine will be entirely exhausted and the SMO will end, or NATO will have to get involved to save Ukraine, and WWIII will begin.

What all these predictions have in common is the sense that we all can feel, that something has shifted, that Ukraine is acting extremely irrationally, pushed by some urgent time-sensitive need. That urgency can only logically be the knowledge that something is running out—whether it’s manpower, ammunition, Western partner support, or a combination of all the above.

Russian frontline reporter Kharchenko’s poignant take:

The Ukrainian counteroffensive near Sudzha is increasingly reminiscent of the battle for Rabotino. We must give credit to the Ukrainian generals, they were able to create conditions under which the Ukrainian army regained its spirit.

A year ago, the enemy was moving forward in Zaporozhye because it dreamed of reaching Crimea and ending this conflict on its own terms. Those dreams were dashed against the Russian defense, and the Ukrainian army began to fade away. Despite all efforts, they surrendered territory and saved reserves.

The breakthrough on the Kursk front gave the Ukrainian troops strength and now they are throwing more and more units into the heat of battle, regardless of losses. The initial raids for tens of kilometers have now been replaced by positional battles. Artillery is increasingly firing in both directions. The sky is saturated with drones. Footage from the front is increasingly reminiscent of the battles for Verbovoye or Rabotino.

The enemy is now intoxicated with its successes, so it is acting reactively. Catching a single enemy vehicle in other directions was considered a great success, but near Kursk they move in groups. If we hold the front, and the enemy continues to burn their reserves, then we will be able to repeat the success near Rabotino.

Ukrainian society is not made of iron, the surrender of Pokrovsk and a second Rabotino can finally nullify their offensive potential. So we have a chance to turn our betrayal into a victory. The only thing that bothers me is that the battles are being fought on our soil. The same events in the Sumy region would be perceived by Russians completely differently.

Alexander Kharchenko

While it’s true that Ukraine is losing a far larger amount of equipment in Kursk than usual, I’m not convinced it still represents a dangerous expenditure simply because the vast majority of it is expendable light armor that is virtually unlimited in the West, though of course there have been some painful prestige system hits as well.

Russian MOD just estimated the AFU’s losses there as follows:

Total Ukrainian losses since the beginning of their attack in Kursk region of Russia.

—4,400 troops

—65 tanks, 27 infantry fighting vehicles

—53 armoured personnel carriers ● 316 armoured fighting vehicles —133 motor vehicles —31 artillery guns

—5 SAM launchers

—9 MLRS launchers, including three of HIMARS system and one MLRS system

—6 electronic warfare stations

—units of engineering vehicles, including two counterobstacle vehicles and one UR-77 mine clearing vehicle.

A more independent analysis could only find 100-150 confirmed destroyed vehicles, so it’s impossible to know where the real number lies—probably somewhere in the middle as usual.

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Now that the Kursk offensive has stalled, the only next step Zelensky has up the escalation ladder is begging the US for ‘permission’ to conduct longer range strikes with US weaponry. The key point everyone misses about this though is that this approval is not about accurately or powerfully hitting Russian targets. No, it’s all about simply getting NATO as involved as possible in crossing Russia’s ‘red lines’ in order to provoke a conflict between the two.

Not only does the new Politico article above imply this, it even offers us an interesting insight about why the US is hesitant to lift restrictions:

In reality, Ukraine has far better success hitting deep Russian sites with low-tech drones which are much harder for Russia to take down, owing not only to their large number and swarm ability but also to how low and slow they can fly, bypassing radar nets. Even Rob Lee just came close to admitting the more premier systems have been mostly useless in hitting Russian territory as Russia easily shoots down ATACMS, Storm Shadows, etc.:

Read the Politico quote below again:

The small drones are a much harder problem also because they’re often made of flimsy materials which are nearly invisible to radar, as the radar waves pass through them—like the infamous cardboard drones.

Some interesting technical matters.

Ukrainian sources released a map of what they believe are Russian force concentrations on each major front:

That roughly amounts to 10-20 brigades, or 3-6 divisions, or 1-2 corps per front.

The latest for Ukrainian unit involvement in Kursk—though it’s only some battalions from each of the brigades below:

And here’s one breakdown of Russian units there:

Remember you can click on all images to make them larger.

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Syrsky likewise released an interesting breakdown of Ukraine’s shoot downs of all Russian missiles since the start of the conflict:

❗️Statistics of missile strikes by the Russian Armed Forces on the territory of Ukraine from Syrsky’s slide

In total, since 02/24/2022, Russia has used 9,627 missiles (2,857 were allegedly shot down).

About strike UAVs. 13,997 were launched (!). Allegedly 9,272 were shot down.

The biggest problem is the Iskander-M/KN-23, Kh-22, Kh-25 and its modifications. Well, and like the S-300. Allegedly 3,008 of them were launched in 2.5 years (!). There is nothing to intercept them with, according to Syrsky.

Statistics: Report of the General Staff of Ukraine on the effectiveness of air defense.

— Total missiles launched by the Russian Air Force/Armed Forces: 9,627

Total missiles shot down: 2,857

Efficiency 29.68%

— Total UAVs launched by the Russian Air Force: 13,997

Total UAVs shot down: 9,272

Efficiency 66.24%

— Missile kill efficiency:

Kinzhal: 25.23%

Kalibr: 49.55%

Kh-101/555: 78.06%

Onyx: 5.69%

Iskander-K: 37.62%

Kh-35: 6.67%

Kh-22: 0.55%

Iskander-M, KN-23: 4.31%

Zircon: 33.33%

Tochka-U: 8.82%

Kh-25/29/31/35/58/59/69: 22.17%

S-300/400: 0.63%

So, not only do we have the remarkable number that Russia has allegedly fired nearly 10,000 total missiles, but that Ukraine has only shot down below 30% of them

The most difficult to shoot down continues to be the Kh-22, of which I wrote about here, explaining why the Kh-22 may be even far deadlier than the Iskander or Kinzhal, according to some experts:

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Syrsky also gave this slide, showing the alleged artillery expenditures:

In short, it claims that Russia is back up to 45,000 shots per day, while Ukraine is up to 15,000. This seems extremely high for Russia and could perhaps refer to all types of tube artillery and MLRS, including 122mm, 130mm, 152mm, etc., rather than just 152/155mm.

A Russian analyst’s take on the above:

Yesterday, all colleagues already took apart the disgrace of Commander-in-Chief Syrsky, who decided to tell the truth and confirm all our and colleagues’ inside information that only 30% of missiles were shot down, and all official daily reporting was a lie.

But all colleagues missed the message that if so many Russian missiles were “missed,” then it means they were flying somewhere, and from this it follows that the losses of manpower, equipment, ammunition, and resources are enormous for the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

Now the conclusion: the real situation is deplorable, and the Kursk adventure was needed to shift the focus from the negative. Bankova knew that such a step would give it situational hype, which could be sold to Western sponsors for the right to new loans and arms supplies. But something went wrong.

Including the leak about the undermining of the Northern Streams by Ukraine, broke the OP part of the game, almost “cutting off” one of the main sponsors – Germany.

A lot will come to light in the future and people will see the light.

Most likely, Syrsky and the OP were prompted to tell the truth by the desire to wrest more air defense from the West, which is in short supply everywhere in the world.

Time will tell if it will help. We are watching…

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Ukrainian MP Goncharenko complains that Zelensky is edging toward mobilizing 18 year olds:

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For all the jeering outcries that Russia continues to suffer security lapses, NATO itself is undergoing some very odd manifestations. In Poland, trucks carrying Ukrainian equipment continue to burn down:

Now there are strange reports out of Germany:

Unidentified drones are flying over the Brunsbüttel nuclear power plant in Germany, and German police are unable to determine who sent them. According to German media reports, authorities believe the drones are Russian, sent from the North Sea. – FRWL reports

With the fearmongering dialing up to max level:

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In the meantime, Josep Borrell has admitted that NATO is involved in Ukraine:

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Military Watch magazine reports that 20 out of 31 Abrams have been destroyed, with the tank proving ineffective against Russian ATGMs:

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A unique battle occurred when a Russian Bmp-3 or BTR-82 encountered a Ukrainian Kozak armored car and Bmp-2 at point blank range in Kursk. The Kozak swiftly reversed out, but the Ukrainian Bmp-2 was hit at point blank range by the Russian 30mm autofire, being destroyed in the process:

Ukrainians tried to claim it was Russian friendly fire, but in fact many different images and reports came out proving it was a Ukrainian Bmp-2 that was destroyed. Here is the image of the Bmp-2:

With Ukrainian channel admitting to it, including that the soldiers inside were killed afterwards:

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Lastly, many know that Russia has been working on their Boeing airliner replacement, the MC-21, for a long time now. A new video has demonstrated its unreal capabilities during ongoing test flights:

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Lastly, Zelensky says the Kursk attack was a way to end the war on ‘Ukraine’s terms’, admitting what every analyst has now been suspecting:

Meanwhile, his own officers believe it was nothing more than a PR stunt to get clicks and likes online:

Kursk offensive is for likes and distraction.

Ukraine’s leadership did the operation in Kursk because everything is screwed up at the front and in the economy. The goal was to “freak everyone out.”

At the same time, the strategic goals of the invasion are unclear, said Dmitry Glushchenko, an officer of the Armed Forces of Ukraine

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