The WHO Constitution is at Odds with the WHO’s Attempted Power Grab

The WHO has its own Constitution, which guides and circumscribes what the WHO can do. Let’s look at what it says.  https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf. The commentary is mine. I am seeking an international lawyer well versed in these documents to help us understand how much wiggle room the WHO has to ignore its own specified procedures and rules.

1.  Information

Article 1

The objective of the World Health Organization (hereinafter called the Organization) shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health.

Article 2 lists the many roles of the WHO, all of which are either advisory or standard-setting, with the exception of the last:

(v)  generally to take all necessary action to attain the objective of the Organization

The WHO Constitution wants the citizens of the world to be informed. The Cambridge dictionary says this means “having a lot of knowledge or information about something.  The Collins dictionary says, ”Someone who is informed knows about a subject or what is happening in the world.” Page 1 of the WHO Constitution says:

Informed opinion and active co-operation on the part of the public are of the utmost importance in the improvement of the health of the people.

Article 2, which lists the functions of the WHO, says in paragraph (q):

(q) to provide information, counsel and assistance in the field of health

There is no authority given to the WHO to control information or direct nations to censor their citizens.

2.  What regulations can the WHO adopt?

Article 21 delineates those subjects for which the WHO is authorized to issue regulations.  They are limited.  The IHR (2005) which is currently in force is in conformance with these guidelines, but the proposed IHR amendments exceed the WHO’s authority for issuing regulations.

Article 23 states that the WHA can make recommendations to members about any issue in which it has competence, but it fails to say that it can issue regulations over as broad a range of issues.

I conclude that the extent of the powers that will accrue to the WHO as proposed in the amendments to the IHR exceed the scope for which the WHO is permitted to issue regulations.  Therefore, if the WHO wishes to ask the WHA to approve the amended IHR, it must do so as a treaty, agreement or convention, and not as amendments to the IHR.  This would require a 2/3 vote of the WHA.

3.  How is the Director-General and his staff allowed to interact with outside organizations?

Article 33 says,

” He may also establish direct relations with international organizations whose activities come within the competence of the Organization.”

However, he must not be instructed or unduly influenced by them, according to Article 37.  How does this accord with 85% of the WHO budget coming from special interests, not from dues, and with the WHO carrying out activities at the behest of its donors, spending 73% of its budget on earmarked activities, which the WHO does not disclose?

We know that the Director-General and other WHO officials meet with “stakeholders” like Bill Gates and the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation (BMGF) staff often to plan or carry out WHO activities.  This may involve funding provided by the BMGF but it may also extend to other activities.  For example, when an expert committee was convened to discuss adding hydroxychloroquine to the WHO’s Solidarity trial, 5 of the 25 experts on the WHO-convened committee worked for the BMGF.  This manner of doing the business of the WHO does not appear to be in accord with Article 37 of the WHO Constitution:

4.  How are matters decided by the World Health Assembly (WHA)?

Article 19 is clear that conventions and agreements require a 2/3 vote by the WHA, not just those present in the room; nor does it say that abstentions will not be counted in the vote.

Article 60 defines how the WHA must vote on “important questions.”  The range of important questions is not defined, but it includes votes on conventions and agreements. Article 60 furthermore indicates that the WHA will vote with a simple majority to determine what categories of questions will need to be voted on by a 2/3 majority.

Articles 59 and 60 specify how votes will occur.  Within the WHO Constitution there is no delegation of authority to committees or to consensus processes in lieu of voting by the WHA.  Yet decisions on past IHR amendments appear to have been delegated to committees that used a so-called ‘consensus procedure’ without a vote.

5.  Immunity

Article 67 points out that all WHO staff and all member state representatives have legal immunity “as may be necessary for the fulfillment of its objective and for the exercise of its functions.”  Has the broad immunity given to all WHO staff been limited in any way when staff are not fulfilling their official duties?  Has this immunity been used to avoid civil or criminal prosecutions?

6.  Relations with Other Organizations

Articles 70 and 71 imply there are likely to be formal agreements about how the WHO interacts with other organizations.  Is there a formal agreement with the EU?  Does it explicitly give the EU and WHO the right to negotiate with each other, even though the EU has never been a member or observer of the WHO?