How US Blackmails Other Countries – Explained by German Diplomat

A video more than a decade old featuring German diplomat Werner Weidenfeld in a TV appearance has resurfaced on Twitter, and it’s worth watching.

In the segment Weidenfeld explains that the United States intelligence agencies embrace Germans when they agree, guilt trip Germans about World War II when they mildly disagree, and blackmail Germans with compromising information they’ve obtained when the disagreements are over major issues.

Jimmy and Americans’ Comedian Kurt Metzger discuss the scurrilous practices engaged in by US intelligence agencies to keep even staunch allies from exhibiting too much independence.

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One Response to “How US Blackmails Other Countries – Explained by German Diplomat”

  1. sovereigntea says:

    Surely our blessed US ally would not have blackmailed honourable UK leaders into blowing £billions on the aborted Afghan project ?

    What was achieved with all of OUR money ?

    UK aid to Afghanistan

    This review examines the relevance, coherence and effectiveness of the UK’s aid investment in Afghanistan since 2014.


    This review awards an amber-red score after finding that, while UK aid has provided valuable support to people in Afghanistan, it failed to achieve its core goal of promoting stability through building a viable Afghan state.

    The UK approach to building the Afghan state contained key flaws and failed to adapt to a deteriorating situation.
    Development objectives were subordinate to security interests and the need to prioritise the transatlantic relationship.
    UK funding for Afghan police salaries did not lead to improvements in civilian policing or the rule of law.
    The UK’s support for basic services and livelihoods through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund responded to Afghanistan’s acute development needs, but overloaded the capacity of the Afghan government.
    The UK scaled up its humanitarian support as conditions deteriorated, but was slow to invest in building resilience to future crises and climate change.
    UK aid helped empower Afghan women and girls, but progress on tackling gender inequality remained at an early stage.
    The UK made effective use of multilateral delivery partners, but its oversight was not always sufficient.
    The UK had an appropriately high risk appetite, but its risk management processes were not always robust enough.
    It invested substantial effort into strengthening programme monitoring systems, but did not assess results at the strategic level.
    While the UK commissioned high-quality analysis of the changing context, learning and knowledge management were not well institutionalised across the portfolio.
    UK departments worked together well within Afghanistan, but there were some tensions at headquarters level.
    The UK was well respected among international partners for its contribution to coordination and dialogue.
    There was limited engagement with many Afghan actors in the review period.

    Full report here