Accelerating absorption of British Military to form EU armed forces

This is not what the media wants you to think about, or even to realise.

Brexit is a joke if we have no armed forces left.  US aircraft carriers to carry British planes says Trump.  British planes to fly off US aircraft carriers.

And this …..
https://www.ukcolumn.org/sites/default/files/documents/Subversion.pdf

Overview of the accelerating EU absorption of the British Military to form the EU military The short briefing sheet has been produced to highlight some of the key areas and perceived risks of the integration of the UK into a single integrated EU defence structure. The content has been compiled by those with military experience, including submarine operations — this experience is considered important in relation to comments made not only in relation to the Royal Navy, but particularly the nuclear deterrent. In focusing in greater detail on some significant Royal Navy issues regarding size of the fleet, specific units and the nuclear deterrent, the joint risks of EU integration to both the Army and Royal Air Force are by no means belittled. On the contrary, there is much more to be said on behalf of these two services than can be covered in this summary paper.

Understanding EU Military Integration Policy The EU has consistently and publicly stated that the goal of the EU is to form a single integrated supranational state, with law, internal security, defence and foreign policy controlled from Brussels. The EU Organisation for External Action (Foreign Policy vehicle of the EU) recently quoted Frederica Mogherini’s policy as follows: “Security is a priority for the EU … We have hard and soft power. We have done more on defence in the last seven months than in decades. Building on the ideas in her Global Strategy for EU Foreign and Security Policy, Mogherini has illustrated the European Union’s three-pronged set of measures to strengthen the EU’s security and defence capability … In a reshaping world the only way for the Europeans to be global players is through the EU.” The implication is clear — EU security and defence capability is to be strengthened as a centralised Brussels-led objective. This is not simply an invitation for member states to contribute more to EU security and defence at will. Many further official EU policy quotes emphasise the integrated EU defence objective. Forming an EU military required a number of significant hurdles to be overcome.

These included: A. integration of EU member states’ armed forces with a wide spread of operational performance, equipment types and levels, experience and historic theatres of operation.

B. imbalance between Britain as a top-tier NATO partner and many other EU nation states.

C. significant strategic imbalance between the maritime strength of the Royal Navy and that of other EU navies, whilst acknowledging the size and capability of French maritime forces.

D. the strong US-UK ‘special relationship’, at both military and military intelligence levels, which produces a tiered military structure favouring the US and UK over EU member states other than the UK.

E. negating the perceived threat to NATO strength and operations by the creation of an integrated EU military.

F. achieving a unified defence procurement and build environment across the EU member states, particularly one which could replace and equal the power and impact of US-procured weapons and equipment entering the EU supply chain, especially via the UK on the back of its special US relationship.

G. integrating the UK and French strategic nuclear deterrents to bring them under centralised EU political control. H. common agreement on defence levels, budgetary contribution and policy amongst EU member states — this includes a single EU treasury.

I. establishment of an EU command, control and communications structure. EU policy has always been to secure its political objects step by step, salami slicing, using the so-called ‘ratchet mechanism’ and the doctrine of never relinquishing any aspect of the acquis communautaire to ensure that member states can not easily retract from progress made towards a political goal. This can also be described as a soft power approach, where the change and political agenda is drifted in under distracting labels and language.

In considering the drive to EU military union, we must recognise that alongside the call for military union arising externally to the UK, i.e. by the EU itself, this key EU political has been driven in parallel from within the UK by our own pro-EU governments, be they Labour, Conservative or ConservativeLiberal Democrat coalition. (N.B.: An important comment is made on Brexit at the end of this briefing.) Since the UK’s internal pro-EU military agenda has been largely driven by stealth, or at least by obfuscation of the real political agenda — a smoke-screen of half-truths, spin and outright denial of the ultimate Westminster goal of a fully integrated EU military — we must look to the broader evidence for this political goal. A simple Internet search on the subject of an EU army reveals entry after entry for mainstream media articles reporting the plan for this key step towards an EU military.

These include: Juncker calls for EU army, Juncker proposes EU military HQ, European Parliament backs plans to create a defence union, Europe forges ahead with plans for an EU army — the overall press and media coverage is too numerous to list, and has spanned many years. The plan for an EU army has thus been ‘hidden in plain sight’ whilst largely publicly denied by the UK government. Behind the scenes, the Westminster political strategy towards the EU military has proceeded apace with a number of key defence-related policies which now, seen together, and with the advantage of hindsight, give a strong pointer to the undeclared pro-EU military line. EU-driven policy for the formation of an Integrated EU military At this point, we return to the potential obstacles to EU military union, and add the measures taken by the EU and its agents in Westminster to overcome the difficulties:

A. integration of EU member states’ armed forces with a wide spread of operational performance, equipment types and levels, experience and historic theatres of operation.

Action taken: Drive a programme of EU exercises and operational co-operation. This objective has accelerated in recent years with, for example, Operation ATALANTA (the joint EU maritime antipiracy force — significantly commanded by the Commandant General Royal Marines), large-scale British and French Army exercises on Salisbury Plain together with the signing of an MOU for those operations and future Franco-British operations, and large scale joint paratroop training. French C3 forces have been integrated into a new joint French military operations centre at the former St Mawgan military airfield in Cornwall. Lately, the EU has been particularly active in driving for EU forces to operate in Eastern Europe, leading to increasing public confusion as to whether these were NATO or EU military exercises. In recent months, the EU has also achieved integration of German and Dutch army units, and several EU member states have swapped command posts, a policy which has allowed a senior French officer to command British troops.

B. imbalance between Britain as a top-tier NATO partner and many other EU nation states.

Action taken: Repeated and substantial cuts to British army capability in men and equipment has now reduced the army to some 82,000 men, and equipment levels which have been openly described as insufficient to fight a major military campaign in Europe, and a complete inability to operate on more than one front. The power and influence of the German army has thus been increased to help restore its position as the traditional European military power, and this effect is being enhanced by integration of Dutch and French units under German command and control.

C. significant strategic imbalance between the maritime strength of the Royal Navy and that of other EU navies, whilst acknowledging the size and capability French maritime forces.

Action taken: Repeatedly cut the size of the Royal Navy by scrapping frigates, destroyers, submarines and serviceable aircraft carriers and operational Maritime Patrol Aircraft so as to bring the RN to greater parity with the French, and particularly to weaken traditional RN operations of scale with the US. Cuts have been exacerbated by delays and increasing chaos in new class orders. It should be noted that such was the rush to destroy the Nimrod MPA fleet that Britain’s nuclear deterrent has been exposed to a level described by many senior military officers as dangerous. At the same time, evidence of unprecedented Anglo-French maritime co-operation has been revealed by the collision between the French nuclear deterrent submarine Le Triomphant and HMS Vanguard — a collision never explained to the British public, but which placed the UK deterrent at grave risk and which can only have occurred due to the deliberate tasking of both units in close geographic proximity. The clear inference is a further layer of undeclared joint Franco-British military co-operation. It is highly significant that the new UK aircraft carriers have been jointly designed with the French, and such has been the damage to continuity in British aircraft carrier operations that there are now grave concerns as to the retraining and work-up time required for flight deck and aviation specialists to be reinstated with historic levels of skills and experience. Royal Navy personnel have had to be sent to the French carrier to be trained, and it should be noted that in 2008 Westminster dropped plans for the Queen Elizabeth class to be joint British-French manned. Significantly, a recent article by the Daily Mail on the new carriers ended with the statement: “As a result the US are expected to make use of the carrier with their aircraft — as may other [EU] countries such as Italy who eventually buy the jets.”

D. the strong US-UK ‘special relationship’, at both military and military intelligence levels, which produces a tiered military structure favouring the US and UK over EU member states other than the UK.

Action taken: US-UK military relations have been successfully undermined by the substantial cuts in UK military force levels (driven by pro-EU political policy in the UK) which have significantly reduced the ability of the UK to support the US in large-scale military operations, as was the case in the Gulf. British anti-submarine capability, highly valued and praised by the US, has also been greatly weakened by UK defence cuts, particularly in submarines, frigates, the decommissioning of our three anti-submarine-focused aircraft carriers and the loss of the Nimrod fleet. Increasing UK involvement with integrated EU military operations, including the installation of a London-based EU military HQ and command-and-control centre at Northwood, sends confusing messages to the US regarding Britain’s commitment to the US and NATO, and has raised questions as to the security of US-UK operations and the protection of high-level intelligence.

E. negating the perceived threat to NATO strength and operations by the creation of an integrated EU military.

Action taken: This concern has been addressed in the first instance by the EU simply and repeatedly denying the formation even of an ‘EU army’ — which term is itself a crafted understatement of the goal of full EU military integraton. This EU political lie has then been reinforced by the EU’s continual failure to recognise, or more accurately to admit, that an EU military must of necessity undermine NATO. To add insult to injury, the EU has simply turned a blind eye to the fact that any EU military must inevitably be substantially weaker than a US-led NATO. Overall, the EU has failed to carry the EU-versus-NATO argument which has been re-ignited following the election of President Trump.

F. achieving a unified defence procurement and build environment across the EU member states, particularly one which could replace and equal the power and impact of US-procured weapons and equipment entering the EU supply chain, especially via the UK on the back of its special US relationship.

Action taken: The EU strategy here has been simple and visible. Pan-European projects were created to introduce both the public and military to the idea of joint European development and production. The development of Concorde was an early lead here, and was followed by both other civilian and military aviation projects such as Tornado and Airbus. We might also consider the scrapping of the UK’s Sea Eagle missile for the French Exocet — the very missile which had been used to sink British ships in the Falklands. The joint UK-French design and build of the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers has now taken the building of major warships out of British national control, has shared our shipbuilding and military specifications with the French, and has helped undermine the maintenance of UK-based shipbuilding and the associated expertise.

G. integrating the UK and French strategic nuclear deterrents to bring them under centralised EU political control.

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